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SIMPLY A MATTER OF GROWING PAINS?
EVALUATING THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING
THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARDS
Derek W. Woolston
Abstract- In 1990, the Washington Legislature enacted the Growth Management Act
(GMA) intending to reduce urban sprawl and manage development throughout the state. In
1991, the GMA was amended to include an administrative dispute resolution system,
involving three independent regional Growth Management Hearings Boards ("Boards")
empowered to hear petitions and to determine whether a county or city is complying with the
GMA. The breadth of discretion given to the Boards to scrutinize local government land use
policies has prompted a barrage of criticism from both local governments and the regulated
community. The tension is attributable to factors within the control of the Legislature and the
Boards and also to factors external to the Boards. This Comment examines the role and scope
of authority of the Boards as provided in the GMA and as demonstrated in the activities of the
Boards since their creation. Major criticisms of the Boards are analyzed along with several
external factors that have contributed greatly to the rising tensions. Finally, this Comment
recommends amending the GMA to maintain the current benefits provided by the Boards
while reducing the antagonism directed at them.
Since its enactment in 1990, Washington's growth management
legislation, the Growth Management Act' (GMA or "Act"), has been
enthusiastically embraced by some and severely criticized by others. The
scope of the debate surrounding the GMA is broad, including both state
and local politics and disagreements over growth management policies.2
The debate has its beginnings in Washington's tremendous population
growth over the past two decades.' In the late 1980s, residents living in
or near the Puget Sound area feared that the rapid influx of people would
undermine the quality of life in the region by transforming it into
something akin to Southern California, with its urban sprawl, severe
traffic problems, and environmental degradation.4 The 1990 Legislature
1. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 36.70A (1994).
2. See generally Kery Murakami, Land Use Lights Up 3 Senate Races: Republicans Also Target
Law Limiting Growth, Seattle Times, Apr. 30, 1996, at B4 (discussing how GMA has created
political firestorm).
3. Steve Wells, Status of County/City Implementation of GMA, in Growth Management,
Regulatory Reform, & Initiative 164 at 3-1, 3-3 (Envtl. & Land Use See., Wash. State Bar Ass'n
eds., 1995). During the 1970s, the state grew by 719,000 people and during the 1980s by more than
734,000. Since the GMA was enacted in 1990, the population of Washington has grown from 4.8
million to 5.43 million people, an increase of 630,000 people in half a decade. By the year 2010,
Washington is projected to have 1.4 million additional residents. Id.
4. See Charles G. Gavigan, The Politics of Growth Management: Compromise Begins Complex,
Contentious Planning Process, in Washington Growth Management Act H-, H-3 (U. of Wash. Ctr.
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responded to these fears by enacting the first of two phases of the GMA.'
As one of the most far-reaching pieces of legislation in the history of
Washington, the Act affects most land use decisions, consolidates the
efforts of state, county, and city governments, and requires a long-term
strategy that seldom has been used in Washington land and resource
management.6 Consequently, the GMA has created many challenges for
state and local government, private enterprise, and the public.
The second phase of the GMA established a dispute resolution
system,7  and created three regional and independent Growth
Management Hearings Boards ("Boards").' Empowered to hear and
resolve disputes involving state, city, and county compliance with the
GMA, the Boards interpret the GMA and enforce governmental
compliance with the Act.' As the only state agency authorized to
adjudicate GMA disputes,'0 the Boards have faced increasing distrust and
antagonism. In particular, the Boards are criticized for misapplying the
standard of review, assuming broad powers when interpreting and
enforcing the Act, and substituting their own vision of growth
for Urban Horticulture ed., 1992); Robert H. Freilich et al., Economic Development and Public
Transit: Making the Most of the Washington Growth Management Act, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev.
949, 949-50 (1993); Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management Revolution
in Washington: Past, Present, andFuture, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 867, 871 (1993).
5. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 871-72. See generally Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.010.
The 1990 Legislature enacted the landmark GMA to guide Washington as it grows into the future,
finding:
[Tihat uncoordinated and unplanned growth, together with a lack of common :,,oals expressing
the public's interest in the conservation and wise use of our lands, pose a threat to the
environment, sustainable economic development, and the health, safety, and high quality of life
enjoyed by residents of this state. It is in the public interest that citizens, communities, local
governments, and the private sector cooperate and coordinate with one another in
comprehensive land use planning.
Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.010.
6. Washington State Growth Strategies Comm'n, Draft Land Use Issue Paper 14, at 16 (Feb. 2,
1990); see also Gavigan, supra note 4, at H-3 (explaining that growth management movement
expands traditional land use policies); Wells, supra note 3, at 3-5 to 3-8 (specifying requirements for
counties and cities who must or choose to be subje t to GMA).
7. Growth Management Act, ch. 32, 1991 Wash. Laws 2903, 2907-12 (revising GMA). See
generally Larry J. Smith, Planning for Growth, Washington Style, in State & Regional
Conprehensive Planning: Implementing New Methods for Growth Management 138, 142-43 (Peter
A. Buchsbaum & Larry J. Smith eds., 1993).
8. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 36.70A.250-.340 (1992). The name of the Boards was changed in mid-
1994 from the Growth Planning Hearings Boarcs to the Growth Management Hearings Boards.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 36.70A.270 n.1 (West 1994).
9. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.280(l)(a); see also Wash. Admin. Code § 242-02-020 (1995).
10. See infra part I.B.
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management for that of local communities." On the other hand, factors
not directly attributable to the Boards help explain the growing
antagonism: a shift of land use decision-making power from local
governments to the state;' 2 a refusal by some local government officials,
private property owners, and developers to "buy into" the policies of the
GMA;13 and vague language in key provisions of the Act that creates
confusion and uncertainty.' 4
This Comment examines the current debate surrounding the GMA
dispute resolution system. Part I provides an overview of the current
practices and procedures of the Boards and discusses the volatile context
in which the Boards operate. Part II analyzes the main criticisms of the
Boards and asserts that the Boards misapply the standard of review
mandated by the Act, creating an excessive burden on local government.
Finally, part III recommends that the Washington State Legislature
clarify several controversial provisions in the GMA, better define the
role and scope of authority of the Boards, and expand the mediation
program to include all parties involved in GMA disputes.
I. A CONTROVERSIAL STATUTE: THE GMA IN
WASHINGTON
The GMA is considered a revolution in land use law in Washington. 5
At the heart of Washington's planning program are thirteen policy goals
that are meant to guide local governments as they develop and adopt
plans and regulations. 6 Essentially, the statute is intended to provide a
11. See infra part II.
12. See infra part I.C.
13. See infra part I.C.
14. See infra part I.C.
15. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 940. Growth management consists of "a conscious
government program intended to influence the rate, amount, type, location, and/or quality of future
development within a local jurisdiction." Daniel R. Mandelker & Roger A. Cunningham, Planning
and Control ofLand Development 595-96 (3d ed. 1990) (quoting D. Godschalk et al., Constitutional
Issues of Groivth Management 8-10 (rev. ed. 1979)).
16. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.020. The following GMA goals are considered by counties and
cities when developing their comprehensive plans and development regulations: (1) encouraging
development in urban areas; (2) reducing sprawl; (3) encouraging efficient multimodel
transportation; (4) encouraging a variety of residential densities and housing stock, including
affordable housing; (5) encouraging economic development; (6) prohibiting governmental "takings"
of private property without just compensation; (7) encouraging timely and fair permit processing; (8)
maintaining and enhancing natural resource-based industries and encouraging conservation of
productive forest and agricultural lands; (9) encouraging open space, development of recreational
opportunities, and conservation of fish and wildlife habitat; (10) protecting the environment; (11)
1221
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framework for local governments 7 to make tough choices about how
best to prepare for population growth in their communities and to help
them coordinate their plans with neighboring jurisdictions."
A. Overview of the GMA
The GMA framework's main component is the comprehensive plan
("plan") that "replaces zoning and development regulations as the [new]
'constitution' of [Washington] land use law."' 9 Under the plan, local
governments must forecast a community's twenty-year population
growth, determine where public facilities" and services2' will be located,
and how the development and services will be financed.22 A key element
of the new land use system is the commitment to urban growth areas
(UGA) "within which urban growth shall be encouraged and outside of
which growth can occur only if it is not urban in nature."'
encouraging citizen participation; (12) requiring that public facilities and services necessary to
support development are adequate at the time development is available for occupancy; and (13)
identifying and encouraging the preservation of sites with historical or archaeological significance.
§ 36.70A.020. The Central and Eastern Boards require that every jurisdiction "me.t and comply with
the Act's planning goals." See Save Our Butte Save Our Basin Soc. v. Chelan County, 94-1-0001
EWGPHB 505, 509 (July 1994) (requiring that county's actions be substantially guided by goals);
Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 93-3-0010 CPSGPHB 405, 423 (June 1994)
(stating that planning goals lead entire process and are integral to Act).
17. All counties and cities must designate natural resource lands and critical areas regardless of
whether they are planning under the GMA. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.060(2). Specific counties,
and cities located within those counties, must comply with all requirements of the GMA if they meet
specific population growth rates or choose to be subject to the GMA. § 36.70A.040(l)-(2). Twenty-
nine out of thirty-nine counties are subject to the GMA. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 872.
18. See Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.010; see also Gavigan, supra note 4, at H-3 (explaining that
GMA requires planning on regional basis).
19. Smith, supra note 7, at 138-39; see also lerschauer v. Tumwater, 94-2-0002 WWGMHB
529, 537 (July 1994) (finding that GMA requires local government adopt comprehensive plan that is
internally consistent document (1) guided by GMA planning goals, (2) guided by countywide
planning policies, and (3) based on objectives, principles, and standards).
20. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.030(12) (defining "[pjublic facilities" to "inclade streets, roads,
highways, sidewalks, street and road lighting systems, traffic signals, domestic water systems, storm
and sanitary sewer systems, parks and recreational facilities, and schools").
21. § 36.70A.030(13) (defining "[p]ublic services" to "include fire protection and suppression,
law enforcement, public health, education, recreation, environmental protection, and other
governmental services").
22. See Wells, supra note 3, at 3-8.
23. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.110. "The GMA universe consists of three major land use types:
(1) resource lands (designated forest, agricultural and mineral resource lands); (2) urban lands, which
are within UGA's; and (3) rural lands which are entirely outside UGA's and exclude resource lands."
Bremerton v. Kitsap County, 95-3-0039 CPSGMI3 1167, 1198 (Oct. 1995).
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The Act takes a "bottom up" approach in that all planning and
implementation under the GMA is left to each city and county.24 The
GMA, however, requires that local governments" comply with the
thirteen goals and meet planning requirements within specified time
frames.26 In particular, counties and cities planning under the GMA must
do the following: adopt a countywide planning policy;27 adopt
development regulations that conserve designated critical areas,
agricultural lands, forest lands, and mineral resource lands; develop a
comprehensive plan; and designate UGAs.2
The first phase of the GMA required planning activities and imposed
deadlines on cities and counties, but failed to provide for administrative
appeals of local government actions by private citizens;29 the superior
courts were the only recourse.30 Shortly after the first phase was enacted,
the Growth Strategies Commission at was charged with providing a
24. Keith W. Dearborn & Ann M. Gygi, Planner's Panacea or Pandora's Box: A Realistic
Assessment of the Role of Urban Growth Areas in Achieving Growth Management Goals, 16 U.
Puget Sound L. Rev. 975, 976 n.3 (1993). Dearborn and Gygi note that:
The term "bottom up" connotes a locally controlled process for decision-making[sic] on growth
management issues. While the [GMA] does not use the term 'bottom up' in its text, the
Department of Community Development ... has developed procedural criteria, mandated by the
GMA, which state that a major feature of the GMA is "[t]he concept that the process should be a
'bottom up' effort, involving early and continuous public participation, with the central focus of
decision making at the local level."
Id. (citations omitted).
25. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.040(1)-(2) (providing that counties and cities located within those
counties must comply with all requirements of GMA if they meet specific population growth rates or
choose to be subject to GMA). Twenty-nine out of thirty-nine counties are subject to the GMA.
Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 872. All counties and cities must designate natural resource lands
and critical areas. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.060(2).
26. § 36.70A.040(3).
27. § 36.70A.210 (requiring counties to adopt countywide planning policies in cooperation with
cities); see also Snoqualmie v. King County, 92-3-0004 CPSGPHB 51 (Mar. 1993) (countywide
planning policies are adopted by counties and used as framework by both counties and cities to
ensure that planning will be coordinated and consistent).
28. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.040(3).
29. See Smith, supra note 7, at 142 (suggesting that problem of having to resort immediately to
superior courts is solved with creation of Boards).
30. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 36.70A (1990).
31. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.800 (1991). The Growth Strategies Commission was created by an
executive order from Governor Booth Gardner and was charged with three major tasks: (1)
"[a]nalyze different methods for assuring that county and city comprehensive plans adopted under
[the GMA] are consistent with the planning goals under RCW 36.70A.020 and with other
requirements of chapter 36.70A RCW; (2) [r]ecommend to the legislature and the governor by
October 1, 1990, a specific structure or process" for accomplishing several major growth
management objectives; and (3) "[d]evelop recommendations to provide for the resolution of
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means for resolving disputes between jurisdictions, clarifying
inconsistencies in the language of the statute, ard answering
interpretative questions without long delays anticipated from judicial
resolution of disputes.32 To resolve GMA conflicts, the Commission
recommended creating an indelpendent dispute resolution system
composed of a panel of independent arbitrators employing mediation and
binding arbitration.33 Appeals to the Washington State Court of Appeals
would be limited to constitutional and procedural issues, such as notice,
publication requirements, and the opportunity to participate in a
hearing.34 The Legislature decided, however, that GMA dispute
resolution should be administered by an independent state agency.35 In
1991, as part of the second phase of the GMA, the Legislature
established three independent administrative hearings boards.3 6
B. The GMA's Dispute Resolution System
1. The Limited Role of the Department of Community, Trade and
Economic Development
Consistent with the GMA's "bottom up" approach, the Legislature has
limited the role of the Department of Community, Trade and Economic
Development (DCTED) 37 to an informational and assistance role rather
than a regulatory and enforcement role.38 In contrast, Oregon and Florida,
disputes over [UGAs] between counties and cities, including incorporations and ainexations." Wash.
Rev. Code § 36.70A.800.
32. William H. Nielsen et al., Practice and Procedure Before the Growth Planning Hearings
Boards, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 1323, 1323-24 (1993).
33. Washington State Growth Strategies Comm'n, A Growth Strategy for Was, ington State: Final
Report 16 (1990).
34. Id.; see also Nielsen et al., supra note 32, at 1324 n.6 (finding that constitutional and
procedural issues consist of "notice, publication requirements, and the opporturty to participate in
the hearing").
35. See Nielsen et al., supra note 32, at 1324.
36. Id.; see also West Seattle Defense Fund v. Seattle, 94-3-0016 CPSGMhlB 773, 774 (Apr.
1995) (explaining that Legislature created three independent boards in acknowledgment of
Washington's regional diversity and patterned after three independent divisions of court of appeals).
37. The DCTED is a state agency with varied responsibilities, such as sering as the central
coordinator for state government in the implementation of the GMA. Wash. Rev. Code § 43.330.120
(1994).
38. See generally Jeffrey M. Eustis, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Growth Management Act
Implementation That Avoids Takings and Substantive Due Process Limitations, 16 U. Puget Sound
L. Rev. 1181, 1185 (1993) ("[K]eeping with the state's tradition of strong local control, the GlvIA
allows for considerable local variation and prescribes a rather limited role for the state oversight
agency, [the DCTED].").
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two states with growth management laws, have provided their state
agencies with more authority than the DCTED.39 Oregon's Land
Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) has the power to
adopt statewide land use planning goals.4" In addition, the LCDC is
empowered to review and "acknowledge" (approve) both comprehensive
plans and regulations or to order a municipality to bring its plan or
regulation into compliance with the goals.4 Florida has a compliance
agreement process, whereby the Florida Department of Community
Affairs determines whether comprehensive plans are in compliance with
the state planning requirements.42
Although limited in legislative authority, the DCTED serves several
important functions under the GMA.43 One of the DCTED's functions is
to provide mediation services;' those services are limited, however, to
disputes between counties and cities.45 The DCTED also provides
"technical and financial assistance and incentives to counties and cities to
encourage and facilitate the adoption and implementation of
comprehensive plans and development regulations throughout the
state."' 6 The technical assistance includes promulgating procedural
criteria to assist counties and cities as they adopt comprehensive plans
and development regulations that meet the GMA's goals and
requirements,47 while the financial assistance includes a grant program.48
Finally, the DCTED reviews comprehensive plans and development
regulations for compliance with the GMA and, if necessary, challenges
the plan or regulation before the Boards.49
39. Id. at 11S5-S6.
40. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.030-.065, .225 (1995).
41. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.251, .271, .320 (1995).
42. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 163.3164(19), .3184 (Vest 1990). If a plan is found not to comply with the
growth management goals and policies, the Department of Administration Hearings Office conducts
a hearing and determines the appropriate remedy. § 163.3184.
43. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 36.70A.190, 43.330.120 (1994).
44. See § 36.70A.190(5); see also § 36.70A.210(2)(d) (providing that "governor may... request
the assistance of the [DCTED] to mediate any disputes that preclude agreement").
45. § 36.70A.190(5).
46. § 36.70A.190(I).
47. Wash. Admin. Code § 365-195-020 (1995); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.190(4)(b)
(providing that criteria "reflect regional and local variations and the diversity that exists among
different counties and cities. . ").
48. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.190(3).
49. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 928.
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2. The Expansive Role of the Growth Management Hearings Boards
In sharp contrast to the limited role assumed by the DCTED, the three
regional Boards play an integral role in resolving GMA disputes.
Petitions to the Boards by private and public paries provide a
mechanism for ensuring that local governments are complying with the
GMA.5" The geographic jurisdiction of the Boards is split by county: the
Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board ("Eastern
Board") covers Washington counties east of the Cascade Mountain
Range; the Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board
("Central Board") covers King, Pierce, Snohomish, and Kitsap Counties;
and the Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board
("Western Board") covers the remaining counties in Western
Washington.5' Each Board is com-posed of three members who must be
"qualified by experience or training in matters pertaining to land use
planning" and who must "resid[e] within the jurisdictional boundaries of
the applicable Board.""2 At least one member of each Board must have
practiced law in Washington, and at least one member must have held an
elected position in a city or county government. 53 A quo:mm, consisting
of two of the three members of a Board, has the authority to decide cases
and order compliance, adopt rules necessary to carry out its powers and
duties, and manage other official business.5 4 The Boards have determined
that they are "quasi-judicial" bodies, an important distinction when
considering the Boards' role and their authority to resolve disputes
arising under the GMA.Y Consequently, the Boards are expressly subject
to the Washington Administrative Procedure Act56 (APA) and are
required to jointly adopt rules of practice and procedure.5 7
The GMA limits the Boards' subject matter jurisdiction to petitions
challenging a local government's compliance with the: GMA or the
50. See Smith, supra note 7, at 142-43.
51. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.250.
52. § 36.70A.260(l).
53. § 36.70A.260(I).
54. § 36.70A.270(4).
55. Wash. Admin. Code § 242-04-020(1) (1995); see also Twin Falls, Inc., v Snohomish County,
93-3-0003 CPSGPHB 183, 216-17 (Sept. 1993). A quasi-judicial body determines "the legal rights,
duties, or privileges of specific parties in a hearing or other contested case proceeding." Wash. Rev.
Code § 42.36.010.
56. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 34.05 (1994).
57. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.270(7); see also Wash. Admin. Code § 242-02-050 (1995) (stating
that rules shall govern all practice and procedure for hearings before board).
1226
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accuracy of the Office of Financial Management's twenty-year growth
management planning population projections.5 8 In 1995, the Legislature
expanded the GMA definition of "development regulations" 9 to include
shoreline master programs." The Legislature also clarified the definition
by including critical areas ordinances and stating that "development
regulations" do not include project permit application approvals, even
though the approvals may be expressed in a resolution or ordinance of
the county's or city's legislative body. In accordance with the Act, the
Boards have determined that they do not have jurisdiction over statutes
other than the GMA and the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA).62
Moreover, they have determined that their jurisdiction does not include
federal and state constitutional issues arising from implementation of the
Act.
63
The GMA contains a straightforward provision describing the persons
who are entitled to file a petition for review to challenge a GMA plan or
development regulation before one of the Boards.' In reviewing
58. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.280 (Supp. 1995). The only documents appealable to the Boards
are comprehensive plans and development regulations.
59. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.030(7) (Supp. 1995) (defining development regulations).
60. See S. 5776, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995) (amending Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.030).
The Boards must review whether the adoption of a shoreline master program or amendment
complies with the Shoreline Management Act. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.280(l)(a). A shoreline
master program must be adopted pursuant to Revised Code of Washington chapter 90.58, and not
under the requirements of the GMA. See Integration of Growth Management Planning and
Environmental Review, ch. 347, 1995 Wash. Laws 1556, 1561.
61. See S. 5776. Though the GMA has always required adoption of regulations protecting critical
areas, the definition of "development regulations" previously did not include critical areas. Wash.
Rev. Code ch. 36.70A. "'Critical areas' include the following areas and ecosystems: (a) [w]etlands;
(b) areas with a critical recharging effect on aquifers used for potable water, (c) fish and wildlife
habitat conservation areas; (d) frequently flooded areas; and (e) geologically hazardous areas."
§ 36.70A.030(5).
62. See Mahr v. Thurston County, 94-2-0007 WWGMHB 579, 581 (Sept. 1994); Twin Falls, Inc.,
v. Snohomish County, 93-2-0003 CPSGPHB 155, 162 (June 1993); North Cascades Conservation
Council & Washington Envtl. Council v. Chelan County Bd. of Adjustment, 93-1-0001 EWGP-B
171, 171-72 (May 1993); Gutschmidt v. Mercer Island, 92-3-0006 CPSGPHB 81, 86 (Mar. 1993).
63. See Mahr, 94-2-0007 WWGMHB at 580-8.
64. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.280(2). The statute confers standing on five classes of persons: (1)
the state; (2) a city or county planning under the GMA; (3) a person who has appeared before the
local jurisdiction planning under the GMA concerning the matter on which review is requested; (4) a
person whose request for review is certified by the Governor within 60 days of filing that request or
(5) a person qualified under the Washington APA's provision for judicial review of agency action,
Revised Code of Washington section 34.05.530. § 36.70A.280(2); see also § 36.70A.280(3)
(defining "person" as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental
subdivision or unit thereof, or public or private organization or entity of any character"); Peter J.
Eglick & Bob C. Sterbank, Recent Growth Management Hearings Board Decisions: Standing To
Maintain a Petition for Review Before Washington's Growth Management Hearings Boards, in
1227
Washington Law Review Vol. 71:1219, 1996
petitions within their jurisdictions, the Boards base their decisions on the
record developed by the local government or by the state Eand supplement
the record only when "necessary or of substantial assistance to the
[B]oard in reaching its decision."6 The review is not de novo.66
Comprehensive plans and development regulations are ]presumed valid
upon adoption.67 When a Board considers whether such enactments
comply with the GMA, it must uphold the enactments unless it finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the GMA was misinterpreted or
misapplied.68 The petitioner bears the burden of proving that the local
government's action or failure to act does not comply with the GMA's
requirements.69 Ultimately, the Board's decision must be based on the
record.7" The Central Board has fcund that the petitioner must do more
than merely raise an issue; rather, "[t]he Board must review the
petitioner's rationale for its contention, and weigh that argument against
the local government's response.' '77 The Western Board has stated that
where a record is "incomplete or insufficient because o:. the failure to
submit pertinent portions, the failure to preserve, or the failure to
Growth Management, Regulatory Reform, & Initiative 164, supra note 3, at 5B-1 (discussing
standing requirements under GMA).
65. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.290(4).
66. See Twin Falls, Inc., v. Snohomish County, 93-3-0003 CPSGPHB 183, 217 (Sept. 1993);
Clark County Natural Resources Council v. Clark County, 92-2-0001 WWGPHB 5, 6 (Nov. 1992).
67. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.320(1); see also Wash. Admin. Code § 365-195-050 (1995).
68. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.320(1); see also Nielsen et al., supra note :;2, at 1325. In Twin
Falls, the Central Board found that local governments enjoy substantial deference from the Board;
however, under the GMA, that deference is diminished when the presumption of validity is
overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. 93-3-0003 CPSBPHB at 223.
69. Wash. Admin. Code § 242-02-632 (1995); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.290 (Supp.
1995); see, e.g., Berschauer v. Tumwater, 94-2-0002 WWGMHB 529, 530-31 (July 1994). The
Western Board analyzes a petitioner's:
[A]ssertions of non-compliance in the context of the following framework:
(1) Is the plan the result of a considered application of appropriate goals and requirements of the
Act?
(2) Did the process comply with the public participation requirements of the Act?
(3) Was the deliberation and decision-making process reasoned?
(a) Is the plan supported by reasoned choices based upon appropriate factors actually
considered as contained in the record?
(b) Were inappropriate factors avoided?
(4) Does the plan fall within the discretion granted to the decision-maker to choose from a range of
reasonable options?.
Id. at 530-31; see also Clark County Natural Resources Council, 92-2-0001 WWGMIB at 7 (using
same test). The test used by the Central Board differs. See infra note 197.
70. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.290(4).
71. Twin Falls, 93-3-0003 CPSGPHB at 195.
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consider an important matter, the absence of evidence can be persuasive
for carrying a burden of proof.
72
The Boards have encountered both procedural and substantive
issues,73 stressing the main goals of the GMA: "to concentrate urban
growth in compact, high-density areas, to provide adequate urban
services at the time of development, and to protect the environment and
natural resources industries."'74 However, the Boards may provide only
limited relief to successful petitioners.75 When a Board concludes that a
state agency, county, or city has not complied with the GMA, the matter
must be remanded to the government entity with directions to comply
within a specified period.76 After this period expires, the Board must hold
a hearing to determine compliance.77 The Boards must transmit to the
Governor all findings of noncompliance whether or not a
recommendation for sanctions is made.7" After the Board has either
issued a final order or denied a motion for reconsideration, the petitioner
has thirty days to appeal the decision to a superior Court. 79 The Central
Board has heard the majority of cases, followed by the Western Board
and the Eastern Board." Several board decisions have been appealed to
72. Mahr v. Thurston County, 94-2-0007 WWGMHB 631, 633 (Nov. 1994).
73. Some of the procedural issues include determining the extent of jurisdiction, the correct
standard of review, and the requirements for standing. Substantive issues include interpreting key
provisions of the GMA and defining ambiguous terms in an effort to answer the ultimate question of
compliance. See, e.g., Twin Falls, 93-3-0003 CPSGPHB at 183.
74. Jay P. Derr et al., Recent Growth Management Hearings Board Decisions, in Growth
Management, Regulatory Reform, & Initiative 164, supra note 3, at 5A-l, 5A-32.
75. wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.300(2) (giving Boards authority to invalidate comprehensive plans
or development regulations only if Boards determine they will substantially interfere with fulfillment
of GMA goals).
76. The state agency, county, or city is given 180 days to comply. § 36.70A.300(1). Since 1992,
out of more than 300 cases, the Boards have sent back 56 local ordinances to counties and cities for
more work. David Postman, Growth Boards Targeted, Seattle Times, Feb. 15, 1996, at B3
(statement by Les Eldridge, member of western washington Growth Management Hearings Board).
77. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.330(1).
78. § 36.70A.330(3); see also Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 927.
79. wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.300(5). In Oregon, by comparison, appeals from the Land Use
Board of Appeals (LUBA) are to the Oregon Court of Appeals. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.850(3)(a)
(1995). The Court of Appeals operates under strict deadlines in land use appeals. § 197.855 (1995).
80. Through September 12, 1996, the Central Board had reviewed approximately 53 major cases,
the Western Board approximately 36, and the Eastern Board approximately 17. Growth Planning
Hearings Boards, State of Washington (Code Publishing Co. Sept. 12, 1996). The low volume of
cases in the Eastern region has resulted in fewer original interpretations of the GMA by the Eastern
Board; therefore, the majority of cases cited in this Comment will be from the Central and Western
Boards.
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superior court, but the heavy caseload of the superior court system has
delayed timely resolution of the disputes."'
3. Sanctions for Noncompliance
Under the GMA, the Governor has the authority to sanction cities or
counties that do not comply with the Act. 2 Most sanctions involve the
temporary withholding of revenues collected by the state and, under
normal circumstances, passed on to the local government."3 In addition, a
county or city that fails to comply risks losing certain funding and
qssistance provided by the GMA, such as technical assistance, grants,
and priority funding for planning projects.'s
C. Factors Contributing to the GMAI Debate
There are several explanations for a local government's failure to
comply with the GMA. Enacting a far-reaching statute in a politically
volatile area of the law inevitably leads to disagreement." Washington's
growth management laws are being challenged by the same issues that
affect land use regulations generally: "more or less regulatory control;
the effects of regulatory control on the economy, the environment, and
the quality of life; whether control should be exercised at the state or
81. Of the more than 300 petitions heard by the Boards, approximately 66 have been appealed to
superior court, of those 66 approximately six have been reviewed by the court of appeals and four
have been reviewed by the Washington Supreme Court. Memorandum from Marjorie T. Smitch,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Washington Attorney General's Office, to Derek W. Woolston (Nov. 15,
1996) (on file with Washington Law Review).
82. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.345.
83 § 36.70A.340. Funds subject to the provision include those raised through the motor vehicle
fuel tax, transportation improvement account, urban arterial trust account, rural arterial trust account,
sales and use tax, liquor profits tax, and liquor excise tax. Carson D. Bowler, I he GMA Manual: A
Guide to the Growth Management Act and the Decisions of the Growth Hearings Boards 148 n.991
(1996).
84. Smith, supra note 7, at 143-44.
85. See Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 958-59
(1992). See generally Washington State Growth Strategies Comm'n, Draft Governance Issue Paper
3, at 13, 19 (Mar. 30, 1990). The Washington State Legislature consistently has met with vigorous
opposition when considering state land use planning. As a result, Washington does not have a strong
tradition of regional governance. Problem areas include local governments with competing
responsibilities, limited funds for increasing local governmental duties, minirral state guidance to
local governments, and limited and competing regional planning efforts. Id.
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local level; and the effect of control on intergovernmental harmony."86
Displeasure with the Boards is based to some extent on differing ideas
about how the GMA resolves those issues.
Despite this divisiveness the majority of communities have complied
with the GMA.87 The rate of population growth in the state necessitates
that changes be made to the traditional land use planning and
management system.8" Governmental commitment to growth
management is demonstrated by the significant investment of time and
funds that have gone into GMA planning activities at the local level.8 9
1. Resisting Change: The Loss ofLocal Control over Land Use
Management
The tension surrounding the GMA can be explained in part by the
resistance of some local governments to relinquish control over land use
matters.9" Prior to the GMA, land use decisions were left to local
governments because of the prevailing notion that an individual
community should decide what is best for its well-being and quality of
life.9' County and city officials were subject to few requirements, as
zoning and related forms of regulation were not mandatory.92 Local
governments were largely autonomous in the realms of general land use,
public facility planning, and development regulation.93 "Given the lack
of legal compulsion to manage growth and the cost and political risks of
86. Robert W. Burchell, Issues, Actors, and Analyses in Stateivide Comprehensive Planning, in
State & Regional Comprehensive Planning: Implementing New Methods for Growth Management
18, 19 (Peter A. Buchsbaum & Larry J. Smith eds., 1993).
87. Wells, supra note 3, at 3-8 to 3-9. The cost of change, both monetarily and socially, is high.
However, the burden has not prevented most counties and cities from making progress. Id. As of
August 5, 1995, 67% of cities and counties planning under the GMA had submitted draft
comprehensive plans and 61.4% of those drafts had been adopted by the county or city. Twenty-
eight of the twenty-nine counties required to adopt countywide planning policies have done so. Id. at
3-9.
88. Id. at 3-8 to 3-9.
89. Id. at 3-8. Through DCTED, the State has contributed $35 million toward local GMA
expenses, covering about one-third of the total costs. Id.
90. See Murakami, supra note 2.
91. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 876; see also Gavigan, supra note 4, at H-3.
92. Id. The State Zoning and Enabling Acts did not have many requirements.
93. Id. Washington State has historically made growth and development decisions at the local
level. Cities and counties planned with minimal state guidance. Many communities preferred small
and diverse local governments, believing that they had greater access and control over governmental
decisions. Washington State Growth Strategies Comm'n, Draft Governance Issue Paper 8, at 10
(Mar. 30, 1990).
1231
Washington Law Review
doing so, few local governments" expended time and funds on formal
growth management planning.94
With the GMA, the Legislature thrust the state into a traditionally
local enterprise and thereby shifted power from local to state officials."
Not surprisingly, this intrusion has angered some local officials.9 6
Despite the Legislature's attempt to leave the majority of control and
planning responsibilities at the local level, some local officials argue that
the State is too involved in matters -that lie exclusively within the domain
of local government.97 The GMA has placed on local governments the
burden of considering the needs of other jurisdictions as well as
complying with the state's demands on an array of matters.98
Preserving "local control within a framework of state goals and
requirements" continues to be the GMA's major challenge.99 Difficulties
arise for county and city elected officials when statewide goals conflict
with the demands of their constituents.'00 These conflicts arise most often
in rural counties, where resistance to state restrictions on land use seems
strongest.' For example, local officials are disturbed when a state
hearings board overturns a land use ordinance by interpreting a GMA
requirement to be more restrictive than they determined it to be.02 An act
by a local government, once thought to be purely legislative in nature, is
now considered to be a matter open to full judicial review by a state
agency. 103
Although some local governments generally support -the GMA and
what it purports to accomplish, others want nothing to do with it."°4 Even
when a local government is willing to meet the requiraments of the
94. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 880; see also Washington Statc: Growth Strategies
Comm'n, Draft Governance Issue Paper 9 (Mar. 30, 1990) (finding that "revenue shortages have
caused many of the growth problems," including "not enough local government funds to plan ahead
for growth, nor provide the necessary infrastructure and open space").
95. See Bowler, supra note 83, at 20-21.
96. See Murakami supra note 2.
97. Id.; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 5.
99. S. 6637, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess., partial veto message (Wash. 1996) (Lowry, Gov., vetoing).
100. See Murakami, supra note 2.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Carol M. Ostrom, Land Use Planning-Or Just Land Grab?, Seattle Times, Feb. 8,
1996, at Al. Several counties have had their plans or regulations invalidated by the Boards. In
addition, Chelan County has been targeted with sanctions by the Governor at the recommendation of
the Eastern Board. Id. at Al 1.
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GMA, adopting land use ordinances that fully comply with the Act is
difficult." 5 When a local government is adverse to the requirements of
the GMA, meeting the requirements of the GMA is seen as an act of
unbridled state intrusion into purely local affairs. t 6 For example, the
Boards have been given the power to invalidate an ordinance that is
deemed to contravene the Act.1"7 Invalidating an ordinance or a
regulation tends to create considerable uncertainty for local governments,
property owners, and developers."8 Several counties claim that
conferring such power on the Boards is an unconstitutional intrusion of
the inherent police powers reserved to local government." 9 The
controversy over the distribution of power between state and local
jurisdictions will most likely continue to generate challenges well into
the future for those implementing and enforcing the GMA. Closely
linked with local officials' frustrations at the involvement of the state in
land use management decisions are private property owners' frustrations
with restrictions imposed by the GMA in the use of their property.
2. The .Ongoing Property Rights vs. Planned Growth Battle
The debate between advocates for property rights and advocates for
government controlled growth consists of a mixture of politics, policy
105. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 896-97. "[L]ocal governments must endure incessant,
acrimonious debate, make extremely difficult political choices, and formulate complex plans and
regulations." Id.
106. See Murakami, supra note 2.
107. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.300 (Supp. 1995); H.B. 1724, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 347
§ 110, 1995 Wash. Laws 1564. The Legislature amended Revised Code of Washington
§ 36.70A.300 of the GMA by enabling the Boards to invalidate local legislation found not to be in
compliance with a provision of the Act. In addition, if the local government ordinance has a savings
clause, the Board can prevent its use if the Board also finds that the former legislation does not
comply with the GMA. Id.
108. The dilemma facing local government officials is what to do if both the enacted growth
management regulations and the pre-GMA regulations are invalidated by the Board. In such a case,
the community would be without laws until a valid regulation is adopted. See Chelan County v.
Washington, Petition to the Washington Supreme Court Against State Officers and Declaratory
Judgment, Dec. 15, 1995; see also, e.g., Friends of Skagit County v. Skagit County, 95-2-0065
WWGMHB 1543, 1547 (Feb. 1996) (declaring several sections of Skagit County zoning code
invalid because they "egregiously interfere with the County's future ability to fulfill the goals of the
Act").
109. See, e.g., Chelan County v. State, Petition to the Washington Supreme Court Against State
Officers and Declaratory Judgment, Dec. 15, 1995 (arguing that state Legislature has no
constitutional power to "command" or "coerce" local government to exercise its inherent police
power to adopt substantive policy).
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arguments, and private agendas."' The divisiveness surrounding land use
management under the GMA often pits neighbor against neighbor."' For
example, the GMA provides that counties designate UGAs as boundaries
that surround established cities." 2 Cities with constituent3 in favor of
growth are upset when the county limits the amount of land earmarked
for growth." 3 On the other hand, cities with constituents opposed to
growth are upset when the county designates too much land for
development.' Some rural property owners argue for more development
to increase their property values, while others support less development
to prevent sprawl and preserve their rural surroundings.' Opposition to
growth management also comes from developers, speculators in vacant
lands near the urban-rural fringe, and farmers outside the UGAs who
anticipate selling their property to developers." 6 Property rights groups
also have resisted growth management on the grounds that it improperly,
and even illegally, encroaches on the property rights of land owners." 7
Controversies that end up before the Boards often involve residents of
a community that oppose some development that has been approved by
the local government. An example is the Blakely Ridge development in
110. See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 104, at Al. In Chelan County, the GMA has generated heated
debate. County Commissioner John Wall and other property rights advocates perceive the GMA as a
tool for urban residents to preserve the environment at the expense of rural residents. But others in
the same county who support planning fear that unfettered growth will destroy theii way of life. Id.
111. Id.
112. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.l10(l); see supra part I.A.
113. See Ostrom, supra note 104.
114. See, e.g., Bob Simmons, New Cities Coming, Eastsideweek (Seattle), Mar. 13, 1996, at 14,
16. King County has approved large urban-like developments outside of the UGA surrounding
Redmond. These developments are strongly opposed by Redmond's residents due to the potential
costs of providing capital facilities, the environmental impact, and the increased traffic. Id. at 17.
115. Id. at22.
116. Katherine Long, 'Last Stand' Looms Over Blakely Ridge Developments, Scattle Times, Apr.
10, 1995, at B1. Developers have sought protection through legislation because they say the Boards
have favored restrictions on development. The Central Board remanded Kitsap County's
comprehensive plan on finding that the plan would allow too much sprawl. King County
Councilman Chris Vance has referred to Central Board members as "unelected bureaucrats thwarting
legislative intent," claiming that Governor Lowry appointed "nothing but left-wing intellectuals to
the hearings board." Id.; see also Murakami, supra note 2.
117. See, e.g., Aagaard v. Bothell, 94-3-0011 CPSGMHB 711 (Feb. 1994) (objecting to plan's
designation of their respective properties, individual property owners challenge Bothell's
comprehensive plan); see also Stephen Clutter, Landowners Leery of County Pla, Seattle Times,
Nov. 13, 1996, at BI (describing how property owners are just beginning to realize that they may
have lost their right to develop their property because their land was designated a:, farm and forest
districts two years ago).
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Redmond."' The plan is to build a 1000 acre community with about
4000 residents, a retail village, and a golf course in an area designated as
rural and consisting partially of wetlands." 9 The petitioners consist of
organizations and private individuals opposed to development outside of
the UGAs."20 The King County Council permitted the developer to move
forward with the project based on the "fully contained communities"
exception in the GMA.' The Central Board found that the development
did not comply with the GMA, but said it would not stand in the way if
King County established that the development met the criteria of the
"fully contained communities" safe harbor." Local residents displeased
with King County's approval of the development sued the county in
superior court.' 3 Just one of many battles being waged over the
implementation of the Act, the Blakely Ridge controversy is a product of
a vaguely written statute that leaves much room for interpretation.
3. Challenged by an Intentionally Vague Statute
The controversial legislative history of the GMA produced several
defects: "politically necessary omissions, internal inconsistencies, and
intentionally vague language."' 24 Each makes the task of interpreting the
GMA difficult and produces disagreement about the Legislature's true
intent. Clark County Natural Resources Council v. Clark County2'
illustrates the difficulty the Boards face when attempting to apply vague
and contradictory statutory provisions. The case addressed whether an
118. Sarah Lopez Williams, Project's Foes Say They'll Go to Court, Seattle Times, Dec. 20,
1995, at B 1.
119. See Simmons, supra note 114, at 15.
120. Id. at 16.
121. See Williams, supra note 118. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.350 (providing "new fully
contained communities" safe harbor exception that allows urban-like development outside of UGA if
certain criteria are met).
122. See Vashon-Maury v. King County, 95-3-0008 CPSGMHB 1385, 1392 (Dec. 1995); see also
Simmons, supra note 114, at 16 (conforming to "filly contained communities" exception requires
that development meet "state-imposed criteria" that includes keeping communities "from sprawling
outside their boundaries and urbanizing still more rural lands").
123. See Williams, supra note 118. Friends of the Law, a citizens opposition group, contended
that the King County Council "had no right to approve the project during a period when a state board
had ordered revisions in the county comprehensive plans." Eastside Development Upheld, Seattle
Times, Oct. 20, 1996, at A4. The Snohomish County Superior Court upheld King County's approval
of the Blakely Ridge development. Id.
124. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 4, at 881.
125. 92-2-0001 WWGPHB 5 (Nov. 1992).
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ordinance complied with the requirements and goals of the Act.126 The
Western Board found that Revised Code of Washington section
36.70A.320 "presents a perplexing dichotomy as to the nature and
standards of review to be used in answering that ultimate question."'
27
The Board explained that "on the one hand, the Legislature has directed
that the development regulation is 'presumed valid upon adoption,' while
[language] in the same section directs that 'a preponderance of the
evidence' is the proper test to determine compliance.', 21 Ore explanation
for the Legislature's decision to produce vague statutory language is that
it allows each region the flexibility to develop plans and regulations that
address its individual concerns and needs. 29 This built-in fexibility may
be used, however, by those opposed to state involvement to limit the
scope and impact of the growth management legislation. 3 '
Attempting to achieve flexibility through vaguely written provisions
has turned out to be a double-edged sword. Although vagueness enables
local government officials to customize plans to address specific issues
facing their jurisdictions, it also places the task of interpreting key
provisions in the statute on the Boards. 3 ' In particular, the Boards have a
substantial amount of discretion to decide their role, scope of authority,
and what force and effect the GMA should have on communities. 3 2 The
Central Board has found that "by necessary implication [it] must
interpret the GMA where ... unclear or vague in order to give [the Act]
meaning and promote consistency within the region.""' In exercising this
discretion, local governments accuse the Boards of goiag beyond a
126. Id.
127. Id. at 6.
128. Id.
129. Diane Brooks, Developers Sue Over Growth Limits: Builders Say Ptiget Sound Board
Usurps Snohomish County Rights, Seattle Times, Feb. 28, 1996, at B3. "Flexibility" is a concept
used to describe statutory language that enables a person to choose from several possible
interpretations depending on the facts of the situation.
130. See Percival et al., supra note 85, at 955 (citing Robert Liberty, The Oregon Planning
Experience: Repeating the Success and Avoiding the Mistakes, 1 Md. Pol. Stud. 45,46-55 (1988)).
131. See Bowler, supra note 83, at 20. "Where the Act is unclear or vague, the necessity for
interpretation is greater than where it is clear. In the latter instance, the Board must derive the
meaning of the statute from the wording of the statute itself." Sky Valley v. Snohomish County, 95-
3-0068c CPSGMHB 1631, 1637 (Mar. 1996) (citing Rozner v. Bellevue, 116 Wash. 2d 342, 347,
804 P.2d 24 (1991)).
132. See Bowvler, supra note 83, at 20.
133. See Sky Valley v. Snohomish County, 95-3-0068c CPSGM-B 1631, 163:3 (Mar. 1996). An
example of where the Central Board has determined that it "must 'fill in the gap' because of the
GMA's ambiguity is the statutory scheme in [Revised Code of Washington section] 36.70A.070(5)
and .110." Id. at 1638-39 (defining ambiguous terms such as urban, rural lands, and rural densities).
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simple determination of compliance towards making policy decisions for
cities and counties.34 For example, Berschauer v. Tumwater
35
demonstrates that the Western Board has interpreted the GMA to impose
a high standard on jurisdictions that choose to prepare subarea or
neighborhood plans.' 36 The Western Board rejected the city's argument
that if a plan generally complies with the GMA's goals and requirements,
a city should be given the discretion to determine within its borders
exactly how to meet that plan's goals and requirements. 1
37
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE CRITICISMS DIRECTED AT THE
BOARDS
Although the tension surrounding the boards is partially attributable to
external factors,' there remain some legitimate criticisms that produce
frustration and uncertainty among county and city officials attempting to
balance GMA requirements with the needs of their constituents. Local
governments are displeased with the large number of petitioners given
standing, the misuse of the standard of review, the interference in purely
legislative matters, and the contradictory interpretations of procedural
rules. First, the Boards are accused of liberally applying the GMA
standing provision; given the broad language of the standing provision,
however, the Boards actually have applied a stricter interpretation than
needed to comply with the provision. Another criticism of the Boards is
that they misinterpret the standard of review by requiring a lower burden
of proof than intended by the Legislature. This criticism is supported by
the Legislature's attempt to clarify the standard of review provision. By
extensively scrutinizing actions taken by elected city and county
officials, the Boards have been accused of exceeding their legislatively
intended role and unconstitutionally usurping power from local
governments. Although local governments must comply with the GMA,
the issue is the extent to which the Boards should interfere in local land
use decision-making to ensure that local governments comply with the
Act. The final criticism in this part concerns inconsistent interpretations
134. Id. at 20-21; see also H.B. 2409, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 5 (Wash. 1996).
135. 94-2-0002 WWGMHB 529 (July 1994).
136. Tayloe Washburn, Update on Decisions of Growth Management Hearings Board and Impact
on Cities and Counties, Land Use & Municipal News (Foster Pepper & Shefelman, Seattle, Wash.),
Nov. 1995 at4.
137. Berschauer v. Tumwater, 94-2-0002 WWGMHB 529, 531 (July 1994); see also supra note
69.
138. See discussion supra part I.C.
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of procedural rules among the Boards in violation of the GMA. Each of
these criticisms will be discussed and evaluated below to determine
whether they have merit.
A. Lax GMA Standing Provision
Over the years the number of petitions filed before the three Boards
has grown at a rapid pace. 3 9 The burden of responding to a large number
of petitions has prompted local governments to attempt to l:imit the scope
of the standing provision as applied by the Boards. 40 Several counties
have argued that many petitioners granted standing by the Boards were
too far removed from the impact of the county or city action. 4' The
current standing provision enables nearly anyone to petition the Boards
to challenge a jurisdiction's enactment of its comprehensive plan or
development regulations.'42 Moreover, Board members have indicated
that petitioners should be able to bring an action without the assistance of
an attorney. 1
43
Rather than giving the standing provision a liberal interpretation as
some critics suggest, the Boards have interpreted the standing provision
as more restrictive than the statutory language indicates."'' The Central
Board has construed "appearing before a local legislative body" to mean
"either [1] by personally appearing at a [public] hearing or meeting at
some time during the process, "2] by personally appearing and
participating or testifying at a [public] hearing or meeting during the
process, or [3] by submitting written comments to the local jurisdiction
or its agents."' 45 Both the Central Board and Eastern Board have held
139. Eglick & Sterbank, supra note 64, at 5B-4. For example, the Central Board has received
petitions for review in 114 cases since its incepticn in 1992. Most were filed in 1995. Id. at 5B-4
n.4.
140. H.B. 2409. The bill indicates that local governments find the Boards' application of the
standing provision to be too liberal.
141. H.B. 2409.
142. See Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.280(2); see also Smith, supra note 7, at 14."..
143. See Nielsen et al., supra note 32, at 1334 (suggesting that petitioner cai manage without
assistance of attorney and rely on Board to hear and decide case fairly).
144. Id.
145. Friends of the Law & Bear Creek Citizens for Growth Management v. King County, 94-3-
0003 CPSGPHB 341, 346 (Apr. 1994) (citing Twin Falls, Inc., v. Snohomish County, 93-3-0003
CPSGPHB 155 (June 1993)). The Central Board has cautioned, however, that it expects active
public participation and that mere attendance at a public meeting without testifying would not be
enough to establish appearance standing. Id. at 346-47; see also Association to Protect Anderson
Creek v. Bremerton, 95-3-0053 CPSGMB 1237, 1243 (Oct. 1995) (finding that if organization
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that oral comments to county staff are, by themselves, insufficient to
constitute "appearing." '46 The Western Board has construed the provision
to require that a person must "appear" regarding a matter by commenting
or attempting to comment upon the matter verbally or in writing.1 47
The liberal standing argument has merit, but it ignores the question of
why so many petitions are filed in the first place.44 Restricting access to
the Boards by making the standing provision more stringent would serve
only to frustrate the dispute resolution process by forcing petitioners to
appeal to superior court for the opportunity to present their case.
Although the presumption of validity, discussed below, is intended to
filter out frivolous petitions, the Boards' application of the presumption
is claimed to be flawed and therefore ineffective at reducing the number
of petitioners granted standing.
B. Flawed Interpretation and Application of the Standard of Review
The GMA provides that "[c]omprehensive plans and development
regulations, and amendments thereto, adopted under [the GMA] are
presumed valid upon adoption."'49 After fully considering the petition
and the criteria adopted by the DCTED, "the Board [must] find
compliance unless it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
state agency, county, or city erroneously interpreted or applied [the
191A.."50GMA]. '' 5
wants to obtain standing before Board under appearance standing standard, it must put local
government it is opposing on notice that it has interest in matter).
146. See Eglick, supra note 64, at 5B-6; see also Friends of the Law, 94-3-0003 CPSGPHB at
346; Save Our Butte Save Our Basin Society v. Chelan County, 94-1-0001 EWGMHB 369, 370-71
(Mar. 1994).
147. See Eglick, supra note 64, at 5B-6; see also Loomis v. Jefferson County, 95-2-0066
WWGM-B 931, 932 (June 1995).
148. See Postman, supra note 81 (stating that 300 cases have been filed with Boards since 1992).
Oregon has a very liberal standing provision but has not faced a flood of frivolous petitions. See Or.
Rev. Stat. § 197.830(2) (1995); see also Robert L. Liberty, Oregon's Comprehensive Growth
Management Program: An Implementation Review and Lessons for Other States, 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
10367, 10373-74 (1992).
149. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.320. Because only comprehensive plans and development
regulations are presumed valid upon adoption, a county or city arguably must put forth a prima facie
case establishing the validity of enactments not falling under those two categories. Bowler, supra
note 83, at 154-55.
150. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.320. Although comprehensive plans and development
regulations adopted under the Act are presumed valid, "jurisdictions whose plans are challenged will
be obliged to furnish a record for [the] review process." Wash. Admin. Code § 365-195-050 (1995).
This presumption is intended to discourage meritless appeals.
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Local governments have argued that the Boards have not accorded
adequate deference to plans and regulations adopted by county and city
officials. 5 ' The Boards allegedly have ignored the presumption of
validity by allowing insignificant amounts of evidence to overcome the
burden. 2 Whether or not intended by the Legislature, the Boards make
determinations as to whether a local community is following "the letter
as well as the spirit of the GMA" when deciding if the presumption of
validity will stand. 3 The Boards have given less deference to counties
and cities that do not substantiate their decisions on the record. 54
The Central Board has required that the contested comprehensive plan
or development regulation be presumed valid if already adopted.'5 The
presumption can be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence in the
record demonstrating that the county or city comprehensive plan or
development regulation is not in compliance with any part of the GMA,
regardless of the consequences) 6 This leaves the county or city exposed
to full scrutiny by the Board when a minor discrepancy is fbund with the
comprehensive plan or a development regulation.
Aagaard v. BothellI 57 demonstrates the ease with which a petitioner
can meet the preponderance of evidence standard. By presenting the
Central Board with a laundry list of claims, the petition increased the
chances that at least one claim would suffice to overcome the
presumption of validity.'5 Although the petitioners alleged a number of
bases on which the Board might find the plan in violation of the GMA,
151. H.B. 2409, § 1.
152. H.B. 2409, § 1.
153. Children's Alliance v. Bellevue, 95-3-0011 CPSGMIIB 1003, 1005 (July 1995) ("The Act
prohibits local prerogatives, whether expressed in policy documents or development regulations,
from thwarting legitimate regional and state interests."); Port Townsend v. Jefferson County, 92-2-
0006 WWGPHB 565, 571 (Aug. 1994) (finding "ultimate reason for the [Boards'] existence is to
make decisions that further the 'planning' concepts, directions, goals and requirerments of the GMA,
and to lesser extent, to make determinations as to legal interpretations of the Ant"); Clark County
Natural Resources Council v. Clark County, 92-2-0001 WWGPHB 5, 14 (Nov. 1992) (Nielsen,
dissenting) (suggesting that hearings boards are obligated to review record to ensure that local actors
appropriately "balance" goals of GMA).
154. See Whatcom Envtl. Council v. Whatcom County, 94-2-0009 VWGMH3 621, 622 (Nov.
1994) (finding that because county failed to substantiate its decisions on record, petitioner had
overcome burden of proof).
155. Twin Falls, Inc., v. Snohomish County, 93-3-0003 CPSGPHB 183,223 (Sept. 1993).
156. Id.
157. 94-3-0011 CPSGM-B 711 (Feb. 1994) (allowing challenge to Bothell's comprehensive plan
brought by individual property owners who objected to plan's designation cf their respective
properties).
158. See id. at 717-31.
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the only claim with which the Central Board agreed was the invalidation
of the plan's policy dealing with senior housing.59 The Board found that
the city, having chosen to address senior housing, failed to analyze
adequately the impacts of this senior housing policy on capital facilities,
the cost of increased capital facilities, and the impact on the city's
transportation and sidewalk policies. 6 On remand, the Board directed
the city to conduct additional analysis in each of these areas.'
61
In 1996, the Governor vetoed a bill that amended the presumption of
validity provision. 62 The bill expanded the presumption of validity
beyond comprehensive plans and development regulations to encompass
any action required by the GMA 63 In addition, the bill replaced the
preponderance of the evidence standard with a more restrictive standard:
The board shall find compliance unless it finds that: (i) The state
agency, county, or city erroneously interpreted this chapter; or (ii)
the action of the state agency, county, or city is not supported by
evidence that is substantial when reviewed in light of the whole
record before the board."6
The fact that a sizable majority of both houses passed the bill
demonstrates that the Legislature intended the Boards to interpret and
apply the presumption of validity more conservatively. 61
C. Legislating for Local Government
If the presumption of validity is overcome, the county or city must
demonstrate that their plan or ordinance complies with the Act based on
"a record which documents deliberations, shows data relied upon, and
explains how conclusions were reached."' 66 The Boards are criticized for
being too strict when scrutinizing locally adopted plans and
ordinances. 67 The issue is not whether the Boards should demand local
159. Id. at 723-25.
160. Id. at 725.
161. Id. at 731.
162. S. 6637, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1996) (amending Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.320); see
also Id., partial veto message (Lowry, Gov., vetoing).
163. S. 6637.
164. S. 6637.
165. The bill passed the Senate by a vote of4l to 7 and the House by a vote of 68 to 30. Id.
166. Wash. Admin. Code § 365-195-050 (1995).
167. See Richard D. Ford, GMA Hearings Board Overreaches in Rewriting Public Policy Bear
Creek Proposal Meets State-Mandated Criteria, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 19, 1995, at A15;
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government compliance with the GMA, but to what extent state
appointed officials should interfere with individual policy decisions that
have been subjected to public scrutiny and approved by locally elected
officials. 68
For example, the GMA states that the thirteen goals are to be
considered by the local government when planning or adopting
regulations, and no weighing or order of priority is specified. 69 The
Boards, however, view the thirteen goals of the Act as "a pocket of
legislative commands that local planners, or even local legislators, may
not eviscerate with planning decisions.' 7.. "Within this paradigm, the
[Boards] alone have the power to ultimately enforce the goals of the
Act."17' The Boards have given the goals the force of law and have been
doing their own weighing and balancing of the goals in establishing
planning priorities."'
The Central Board has overreached its legislatively intended authority
by adopting "bright line" rules on what the appropriate densities are for
urban and rural areas. 73 The GIv[A itself is silent on exact densities,
because local governments were presumed to have discretion in defining
those densities within the general parameters of the GMA goals. 74 If a
see also supra note 24 (discussing Legislature's intention of leaving land use decisions largely in
hands of local decision-makers).
168. See Bowler, supra note 83, at 20-21 ("[T]he hearings boards, in neg.ting any substantive
local decision, are arguably commandeering a 'super-legislative veto,' selecting their policy
preferences over those expressed by the locality.").
169. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.020 (providing that "goals are not listed in order of priority and
shall be used exclusively for the purpose of guiding the development of comprehensive plans and
development regulations").
170. See Bowler, supra note 83, at 20.
171. Id. at21.
172. Id. at 20-21. The actions of the Boards do not comply with the Act inso Far as the Legislature
intended the process of planning to be bottom up. See supra note 24.
173. See Sky Valley v. Snohomish County, 95-3-0068c CPSGMHB 1631, 1634-43 (Mar. 1996)
(rejecting argument by Snohomish County that Boards lack authority to adopt substantive "bright
line" rules for urban and rural densities); Vashon-Maury v. King County, 95-3-0008 CPSGMHB
1245, 1296 (Oct. 1995) (adopting as general "bright line" rule that any resident al pattern of 10 acre
lots or larger is rural); Bremerton v. Kitsap County, 95-3-0039 CPSGM-B 1167, 1200 (Oct. 1995)
(adopting as general "bright line" rule that any residential pattern of four net dwelling units per acre
is urban); Berschauer v. Tumwater, 94-2-0002 WWGMHB 529, 531 (July 1994) (rejecting
Turwater's argument that City has discretion to designate land use within subarea component of
comprehensive plan as city sees fit, as long as overall plan is shown to have me: requirements of the
Act). This is fairly radical and throws into doubt a large amount of existing zoning and planning for
suburban areas in the middle (not rural or urban). For example, local governments are having
difficulty determining where one acre per unit lots fit within the GMA construct.
174. See supra note 24. Administrative agencies are "creatures of the legislature without inherent
or common law power" and can only exercise those powers conferred either expressly or by
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density level selected by the county or city does not meet the "bright
line" standard, the Central Board will subject the plan "to increased
scrutiny... to determine if the number, locations, configurations and
rationale for such lot sizes complies with the goals and requirements of
the Act, and the jurisdiction's ability to meet its obligations to accept any
allocated share of county-wide population."'75
The Central Board has interpreted its role as being more than merely
adjudicatory but limited "to determining whether the legislative actions
taken by local legislative authorities actually comply with the
requirements of the GMA."' 76 The Central Board will defer to the local
government therefore if the challenge is to a local, quasi-judicial
governmental decision.'77 Despite this self-declared limitation, the
Central Board is accused of "tak[ing] it upon itself to cherry-pick and
change public policy with which it doesn't agree."' 78 One example of the
increased tension arising from the Central Board's scope of review is a
suit by the Master Builders Association of King and Snohomish Counties
(Master Builders).'79 The Master Builders claimed that the Central Board
necessary implication. Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30, 97 Wash. 2d 118, 125, 641
P.2d 163, 166-67 (1982) (quoting State v. Munson, 23 Wash. App. 522, 524, 597 P.2d 440, 442
(1970)).
175. Bremerton v. Kitsap County, 95-3-0039 CPSGMHB 1167, 1200 (Oct. 1995).
176. See Twin Falls, Inc., v. Snohomish County, 93-3-0003 CPSGMHB 183, 216 (Sept. 1993);
see also Bowler, supra note 83, at 123 (suggesting that making distinction between "quasi-judicial"
and "legislative" actions by local government is difficult). Legislative actions are characterized by
the Central Board as:
1) adopting, amending or revising comprehensive . . . plans or other land use planning
documents; 2) adopting zoning amendments of "area-wide significance;" 3) adopting area-wide
zoning ordinances; 4) debating "public policy;" employing ultimate decision-making discretion;
and, 5) responding "to changing conditions through the enactment of a new general law of
prospective application."
Id.
177. See Bowler, supra note 83, at 123. Quasi-judicial acts are characterized by the Central Board
as:
1) determining of legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties in a hearing or other
contested case proceeding; 2) examining and cross examining sworn witnesses; ensuring
"procedural due process and appearance of fairness in regulatory hearings;" 3) interpreting,
reviewing and implementing land use regulations;"[sic] 5) invoking the traditional and ordinary
function of courts; and, 6) applying "existing law to past or present facts for the purpose of
declaring or enforcing liability."
Id. at 123-24; see also supra note 55.
178. See Ford, supra note 167. The Central Board is accused of splitting off and disapproving
pieces of county plans and selectively entering into public policy areas reserved to local legislative
bodies. Id.
179. See Brooks, supra note 129.
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had "meddl[ed] too deeply with Snohomish County's environmental
policies." ' The Central Board found Snohomish County's critical areas
protection laws too lax."' Criticizing the Central Board's decision, the
Master Builders' have "call[ed] it arbitrary, capricious, and in violation
of the board's legal mandate to uphold the principle of local decision-
making."'8 2 The suit cites prior Eastern and Western Board decisions as
evidence of local governments being allowed to create less stringent
regulations to protect wetlands and other sensitive areas.8 3
Although appeals have been made to state courts and the Legislature
calling for limitations on the Boards' authority to interi.ere with local
legislation, none have succeeded at delineating the appropriate amount of
authority given to the Boards under the GMA.'84 The question remains,
therefore, whether the Boards are acting as policy-makers for local
jurisdictions. The answer would appear to be yes given that the
Legislature recently passed a bill clarifying the role of the Boards." 5
D. Procedural Rules Inconsistently Interpreted and Applied by the
Boards
Unlike other Washington state administrative boards, which have
statewide geographic jurisdiction,8 6 the Legislature created three
180. Id.
181. Pilchuck v. Snohomish County, 95-3-0047 CPSGMHB 1409 (Dec. 1995) (rejecting county's
exemption of 43,000 lots, consisting of one-third of county, from new law and requiring buffers even
around small wetlands).
182. See Brooks, supra note 129. According to John Spangenberg, th,,- Master Builders'
Snohomish County Director, the fundamental rationale of growth management rests upon who
makes the decisions. Id.
183. Id.
184. House Bill 2409 was vetoed by the Governor. Chelan County's petition was rejected by the
Washington Supreme Court. Chelan County v. State, Petition to the Washington Supreme Court
Against State Officers and Declaratory Judgment, Dec. 15, 1995.
185. As mentioned previously, the Legislature passed a bill in 1996 amending Revised Code of
Washington section 36.70A.320. See S. 6637 § 5. In that bill, the Legislature added language
clarifying that "[i]n recognition of the broad range of discretion that may be e.ercised by counties
and cities consistent with the requirements of. . . [the GMA], the board shell not substitute its
judgment for that of a county or city regarding the exercise of such discretion." The bill also stated
that "[the board has no discretion to prioritize, balance, or rank the [thirteen] goals .... § 5.
186. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 43.21B.010 (1994) (creating pollution control hearings board
with statewide jurisdiction); Wash. Rev. Code § 75.20.130 (1994) (creating hydraulic appeals board
with statewide jurisdiction); Wash. Rev. Code § 76.09.210 (1994) (creating fortst practices appeals
board with statewide jurisdiction); Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.170 (1994) (creating shorelines
hearings board with statewide jurisdiction).
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independent regional Boards. 87 Regional diversity appears to be the key
reason for creating three Boards. 188 Nonetheless, the three Boards are
required to jointly adopt rules of practice and procedure and abide by the
Washington APA.'89 In theory, then, although interpretations of GMA
provisions by the three Boards may not always be consistent, the
procedural rules promulgated by the Boards must be applied consistently.
Procedural rules, however, have been inconsistently interpreted
among the Boards. For example, the Boards have disagreed both on the
appropriate application of the standard of review and on the binding
effect of final orders. These fundamental differences have translated into
local governments and practitioners receiving mixed messages regarding
procedure before the Boards. If the difference in treatment is not related
to regional accommodation, as appears the intention of the Legislature
when it created three separate Boards,19 then the differences must derive
from a failure by the Boards to agree upon the interpretation of a rule or
provision of the GMA.'9'
1. Standard of Review
The Western Board and the Central Board have developed different
applications of the standard of review. 92 In interpreting part of the GMA,
both the Central and Western Boards have established the scope of
review as whether the enactment complies with the requirements and
187. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
188. See Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.190(4)(b) (requiring that DCTED adopt procedural criteria,
to assist counties and cities with planning, that reflect regional and local variations); Wash. Rev.
Code § 36.70A.250(2); Wash. Admin. Code § 242-02-020 (1995) ("The function of a board is to
make informed decisions on appeals ... that recognize[] regional diversity."); see also West Seattle
Defense Fund v. Seattle, 94-3-0016 CPSGMIB 773, 774 (Apr. 1994). The Central Board has
reminded parties "that the legislature created three independent growth management hearings boards
in an acknowledgment of this State's regional diversity." The Board noted that "Ithis feature is one
of the hallmarks of the GMA, patterned after our judicial system with its three independent divisions
of the Court of Appeals." Id.
189. See supra note 57.
190. See supra note 188.
191. West Seattle Defense Fund, 94-3-0016 CPSGM-B at 774. Although the Central Board has
agreed to review and consider the decisions of the other hearings boards, it has reiterated that it must
make its own determination as to the proper interpretation of the Act within the Central Puget Sound
region. The Board also noted that "[b]riefs of parties that cite to decisions of other boards under the
erroneous assumption that those decisions are binding upon this Board, do lose some credibility with
the Board." Id.
192. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.320(l) (stating standard of review to be applied).
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goals of the Act. 93 Having determined the scope of its review, the
Western Board has admitted its difficulty in determining the standard of
review." The Western Board has used a "mid-tier" artalysis that, in
modified form, harmonizes the provisions within the Act in such a
manner that complies with both the overall scheme and philosophy of the
Act and also complies with legislative intent.9
The Central Board did not find the question of the proper standard of
review as perplexing as the Western Board, observing: "To reach a
finding of inconsistency [with the GMA], the Board must determine that
the presumption of validity granted local government by [Revised Code
of Washington section 36.70A.320] has been overcome by a
preponderance of the evidence."' 96 The Central Board has strictly
interpreted the Act's standard of review as stated at Revised Code of
Washington section 36.70A.320,197 refusing to adopted the Western
Board's four-part standard of review.
198
Each Board continues to interpret Revised Code of Washington
section 36.70A.320 differently, regardless of the potential for opposite
outcomes if given the same set of facts. 99 The Central Board is much
more strict in its scrutiny of whether a local government is in
compliance.00 The result is that a local government brought before the
Central Board receives a much closer examination than one brought
before the Western Board.20'
193. Gutschmidt v. Mercer Island, 92-3-0006 CPSGPHB 81, 86 (Mar. 1993); Tracy v. Mercer
Island, 92-3-0001 CPSGPHB 31, 43 (Jan. 1993); Clark County Natural Resources Council v. Clark
County, 92-2-0001 WWGPHB 5, 5-6 (Nov. 1992); see also 23 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. (1992)
(requiring local governments consider GMA's planning goals, including Revised Code of
Washington section 36.70A.020(6)).
194. See supra notes 125-128.
195. See supra note 69 and accompanying text-
196. Tracy, 92-3-0001 CPSGPHB at 43; see also Gutschmidt, 92-3-0006 CPS3PHB at 86.
197. West Seattle Defense Fund v. Seattle, 94-3-0016 CPSGMHB 773, 774 (Apr. 1994); see also
Twin Falls, Inc., v. Snohomish County, 93-3-0003 CPSGP-B 183, 217-224 (Sept. 1993) (detailing
how Central Board interprets GMA's standard of review, burden of proof, and presumption of
validity).
198. See supra note 69 and accompanying text
199. See Bowler, supra note 83, at 154-58.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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2. Final Orders
The Central and Western Boards disagree on the binding effect of a
final order upon remand to a local government." 2 This disagreement has
little to do with regional differences in applying the Act and much to do
with fundamental procedural differences, resulting in unnecessary
confusion and frustration for those local governments and practitioners
attempting to work within the framework of the Boards.
The Western Board has indicated that a Board has no authority to
specifically order a particular action be taken after finding
noncompliance.0 3 Although the Western Board makes suggestions and
recommendations, the local government is left to determine how it
wishes to come into compliance with the Act." Revised Code of
Washington section 36.70A.330(l) states that a compliance hearing is for
the purpose of determining whether the local government "is in
compliance with the requirements of [the Act]."20 5 The Western Board
has interpreted this provision to mean whether the local government
complied with the GMA and not whether there has been strict adherence
to the recommendations issued in the final order. 6 The Western Board
also decided "that matters which were not of the original finding of non-
compliance cannot be used at the hearing as a basis for determining
whether compliance has been achieved.20 7
The Central Board has rejected the contention "that the [appropriate]
test of compliance is solely whether [a county or city] complied with the
statutory language of the GMA, rather than with the Board's final
decision and order."20 8 Agreeing with the Western Board, the Central
Board has held that the ultimate discretion to implement the GMA rests
with local governments.0 9 The Central Board, however, has found "a
202. A final decision and order represents a Board's conclusion of what contested GMA
provisions require or allow. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.300.
203. Port Townsend v. Jefferson County, 94-2-0006 WWGMIB 639, 639-40 (Dec. 1994).
204. Id. (finding that "local decision-makers are the proper persons to implement the GMA as
long as the parameters established by the Act are adhered to").
205. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.330(I).
206. Port Townsend, 94-2-0006 WWGMHB at 640 (finding that "[t]he specific mechanism for
achieving compliance rests solely with local government").
207. Id.
208. Tacoma v. Pierce County, 94-3-0001 CPSGMHB 1359, 1362 (Jan. 1995).
209. Id.
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significantly different perspective on its own role in the process.
According to the Central Board, the Boards are responsible for
"interpret[ing] the GMA when it is unclear and/or in dispute and, based
on the facts and arguments in a case, . . . issu[ing] findings and
conclusions. ' 2 ' Contrary to the Western Board, the Central Board has
found that its final decision and order is "more than a mere suggestion or
recommendation., 212 The Central Board has concluded that by the time
the compliance hearing takes place the county, city, or state agency
"must comply not just with the statutory language but also with the
Board's final decision and order, however specific it might be."2 3 The
Central Board claims to leave "the task of legislating ... to the elected
local policy makers" as provided by the GMA.214 This does not square,
however, with the Central Board's practice of giving specific directions
on how the local government is to comply with the GMA.215
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations share a common goal-reducing
some of the controversy surrounding the Boards without disturbing the
benefits that accrue from them. While growth management laws seek to
balance environmental values with private control of property, the
ultimate effectiveness of growth management laws depends upon strong
public support and political leadership.2"6 Educating the public about the
requirements and objectives of the GMA is critical to its success over the
long run.217
210. Id.; see also Twin Falls, Inc., v. Snohomish County, 93-3-0003 CPSGPHIB 183, 223 (Sept.
1993).
211. Tacoma, 94-3-0001 CPSGMIB at 1362.
212. Id. at 1363; see, e.g., Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 93-3-0010
CPSGM-B 937, 939 (June 1994) (finding that local governments have "duty" to comply with final
decision even if decision has been appealed).
213. Tacoma, 94-3-0001 CPSGMHB at 1363.
214. Id.
215. See Bowler, supra note 83, at 141.
216. See Percival et al., supra note 85, at 952.
217. Governor Lowry has found that "[p]eople acting in good faith have come to very different
conclusions about how best to manage growth." S. 6637, partial veto message (Lowry, Gov.,
vetoing). In response, he has requested that the Land Use Study Commission make recommendations
to the Legislature and to the Governor regarding improvements to the GMA's dispute resolution
structure. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 90.61.010-.902 (Supp. 1995).
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A. The Boards Should Be Maintained
The Boards are vital to the successful implementation of the GMA.
They alleviate the burden on the superior court system, provide a timely
means of dispute resolution, and offer a high level of expertise in land
use management.2 8 The large number of petitions heard by the Boards
and the constant backlog of cases in superior court demonstrates the need
for a separate GMA dispute resolution system.219 Moreover, Board
members must be experts in the field of land use planning, thus resulting
in a better understanding of the issues.22 Presumably, fewer parties
would appeal local government actions directly to the superior courts due
to the high litigation costs, thus disputes may go unresolved, conflict
may escalate, and the GMA may be much less effective at managing
urban sprawl.
Despite the effort to comply generally with the GMA and the Boards'
orders, most communities are facing monumental challenges that cannot
be ignored.22' Because the heart of the controversy is the GMA, the
solutions must come from the Legislature.
B. The Legislature Should Clarify Vague Language in the GMA
The Legislature should clarify vague language in the main provisions
of the GMA as it leads to second-guessing by the Boards and those
subject to their final decisions.222 This uncertainty has created
unnecessary frustration for local government officials and property
owners and hindered support for the GMA. If the Legislature wants the
Boards to have the discretion to interpret vague provisions in the GMA,
then clearer authorizing language is necessary. On the other hand, if the
Legislature wants to restrict the Boards' discretion, then a limitation on
the Boards' interpretative powers is necessary. Based on the activities of
the Boards to date, their experience in land use planning, and the limited
state role prior to a petition being filed, the Legislature should reaffirm
the Boards' authority to interpret the GMA. The Boards' discretion to
interpret, however, should be qualified by a provision similar to that in
the bill passed by the Legislature and vetoed by the Governor: the Boards
218. See supra part LA.2.
219. See supra notes 81 and accompanying text.
220. Wash. Admin. Code § 242-02-010 (1995).
221. See supra notes 87-89.
222. See supra notes 124-137.
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should not substitute their own judgment for that of a county or city and
the should have no discretion to prioritize, balance, or rank the thirteen
goals for a local government.2"
C. The Burden Necessary To Overcome the Presumption of Validity
Should Be Strengthened
Strengthening the role of the DCTED, as explained below, or another
state agency, similar to Oregon's Land Conservation and Development
Commission,224 would provide assurance to local communities that the
county or city is in compliance with the GMA.? Once the
comprehensive plan is approved, the Board would be limited to the
precise issues raised in the petition and to the specific GV[A provisions
that are implicated. Only clear and convincing evidence, as opposed to a
preponderance of the evidence, should overcome the presumption that a
local action is valid. Early involvement by the state in the approval
process would ensure that the comprehensive plan complies with the
GMA and thereby reinforce the presumption of validity and lessen the
need for aggressive review of local actions by the Boards.
D. Procedural Rules Should Be Applied Consistently Among the
Boards
The Legislature mandated that the Boards promulgate a single set of
procedural rules.226 The Boards have not followed this mandate.
Regional diversity is not a factor where procedural rules are concerned. 8
The force and effect of a final decision and order should be decided by
all three Boards and promulgated as a rule in the Washington
Administrative Code. The rule should take into account the burden on
local governments as they attempt to balance the goals of the GMA with
the often conflicting demands of their residents. A single, straightforward
interpretation of the GMA will serve to increase certainty for petitioners
and respondents as to what is truly expected after a Board reaches its
223. S. 6637 § 5; see supra part II.C.
224. See Edward J. Sullivan, Oregon Blazes a Trail, in State & Regional Comprehensive
Planning: Implementing New Methods for Growth Management 50, 52 (Peter A. Buchsbaum &
Larry J. Smith eds., 1993).
225. See infra part III.F.
226. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
227. See supra part II.D.
228. Id.
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final decision. Similarly, the standard of review and scope of review
should be the same among all three Boards.
E. Appeals Should Be Made Directly to the Court ofAppeals Instead
of Superior Court
Washington should follow Oregon's land use appeals process by
enabling parties to appeal Board decisions directly to the court of appeals
instead of superior court." First, a decision from the court of appeals
will carry more precedential weight in an area of the law desperately in
need of judicial guidance. Second, Board decisions are generally not
heard de novo, suggesting that a court of review would be more
appropriate forum than a trial court. Finally, the tendency for GMA
issues to repeat themselves throughout the state suggests the need for a
quick response, a clear statewide message, and a published opinion.
F. The DCTED's GMA Role Should Be Expanded and Strengthened
The DCTED should be the rule-making and broad enforcement
agency of the GMA, and the Boards the adjudicatory agency. The
Legislature limited the role of the DCTED in the implementation of the
GMA. 230 A vacuum exists where a formal state enforcement and review
process belongs. The Boards have been forced to fill this vacuum by
comprehensively reviewing local government actions for discrepancies
with the GMA requirements."M The task of reviewing whether a plan has
complied with the GMA, however, should reside with a state agency that
is not empowered to hear individual petitions. The responsibility for
oversight should reside with the DCTED to ensure that all
comprehensive plans and development regulations are and continue to be
consistent with the goals and requirements of the GMA. In other words,
the Boards should act as the "safety valve" for challenges that erupt after
approval of local government planning activities by the DCTED. 32
229. See Sullivan, supra note 224, at 78. In Oregon, judicial review of LUBA orders may be
sought in the Oregon Court of Appeals by any party under Or. Rev. Sta. § 197.850 (1995). Id. Only
about 20% of LUBA decisions are appealed. See Liberty, supra note 148, at 10374.
230. See Wash. Admin. Code § 365-195-020 (1995). Although the Legislature adopted bottom
up planning to assuage local government concerns about a strong state presence in land use
decisions, the Boards have created that state role nonetheless, and perhaps in a more antagonistic
way.
231. See supra part Ml.C.
232. This would be similar to the scheme used under the Shoreline Management Act, Revised
Code of Washington chapter 90.58 (1994). The Department of Ecology is authorized to review and
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Unlike Oregon and Florida, the Washington growth management
program provides for little direct oversight by the state over counties and
cities that plan under the GMA.23: No formal review or approval is
required by the state for a couity or city to be considered "in
compliance" with the GMA."3 The DCTED does have limited oversight
powers, but exists mostly as an advisory body and conduit for funding
GMA planning activities and providing technical assistance 35 If the
GMA is truly a statewide effort to implement consistent land use and
resource management policies and control growth, then compliance is
essential. Oregon and Florida have proven that a state enforcement
mechanism must at some point be implemented.236 The Boards are
neither empowered nor equipped to deal with both widespread
enforcement and individual petitions. Therefore, the DCTED should be
empowered to review and approve all comprehensive plans and
amendments prior to their adoption by local governments. The Boards
would then be limited to individual cases of noncompliance with the
objective of addressing only the specific issues alleged.237
Increasing the scope of the mediation program offered by the DCTED
also may provide a less controversial method of compromise for
disputing parties. But the refusal by some local government officials,
private property owners, and developers to "buy into" the policies of the
GMA may thwart widespread use of the mediation services.
approve master programs and amendments to master programs to ensure that they comply with the
goals and policies of the Shoreline Management Act as stated in Revised Code of Washington
section 90.58.020. Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.090 (1994). The Department's actions are subject to
appeal by a local government to either a Growth Management Hearings Board or the Shoreline
Hearings Board. Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.190 (1994).
233. See Gavigan, supra note 4, at H-9.
234. See Smith, supra note 7, at 143-44. Oregon subjects all local plans and regulations that have
been adopted by local jurisdictions to a formal review by the State Land Conservation and
Development Commission (LCDC), a process known as "acknowledgment." Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 197.251-.254 (1995); see also Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.015(1) (1995) (defining "acknowledgment").
235. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.190; Wash. Admin. Code § 365-195-020 (1995).
236. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
237. The standard of review should be similar to that used by the Shoreline Hearings Board when
it reviews local government rules, regulations, or guidelines that have been approved by the
Department of Ecology. The approved rule, regulation, or guideline is presumed valid unless the
Shoreline Hearings Board finds that it is clearly erroneous in light of the policy of the Shoreline
Management Act, is a violation of the constitution, is arbitrary or capricious, was developed without
fully considering and evaluating all material submitted to the department during public review and
comment, or was not adopted in accordance with required procedures. Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.180
(1994).
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V. CONCLUSION
At each stage of GMA implementation, tough choices must be made
that may have significant negative impacts on specific classes of persons.
Targeting the Boards may be easier than acknowledging the negative
consequences of compromise and change. The Boards may be exceeding
their mandate in the GMA, but this may be explained partially by the
vagueness of the Act and the politics of growth management that create a
tense setting for resolving very controversial and often complex disputes.
The responsibility rests with each person affected by the GMA to
become involved in the legislative process in an effort to develop a
growth management strategy that works. Effectively implementing the
GMA is in the best interest of the larger population of Washington. The
role of the Boards, therefore, should be reviewed and clarified by the
Legislature in cooperation with local government representatives. The
objective should be to reduce the burden on local governments while
ensuring that public and private parties have an effective system
available for resolving the inevitable conflicts that will arise over the
GMA.
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